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Noncompliance with Non-Accounting Securities Regulations and GAAP 
Violations 
 
Abstract: Using enforcement actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a 
proxy for noncompliance with securities regulations, we examine whether a firm’s compliance 
with non-accounting laws and regulations is associated with GAAP violations. We find that 
firms that violate securities regulations related to non-accounting issues are more likely to report 
accounting restatements than control firms that comply with securities regulations. We also find 
that the difference between the two groups is significant only for the periods subsequent to the 
start of the noncompliance period but not for periods prior to this date. Our results highlight the 
interrelation between the accounting and compliance systems, and suggest that managers who 
are non-compliant with non-accounting regulations are also more likely to be non-compliant with 
accounting rules. 
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The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) oversees the securities markets in the U.S. to 
protect investors and to maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets (SEC, 2017). To achieve its 
objectives, the SEC conducts investigations into possible violations of securities regulations and 
brings enforcement actions against individuals and companies when rules are breached. 
Although the SEC’s enforcement actions cover various types of securities regulation violations 
(e.g., insider trading, accounting fraud, market manipulations, and providing false or misleading 
information about securities or the issuing companies), prior research on SEC enforcement 
actions has primarily focused on accounting misrepresentation and has not fully explored the 
violation of securities regulations regarding non-accounting matters.1 As Hayes (2015) argues, 
restricting the analysis to enforcement actions involving accounting misrepresentation can limit 
our understanding of the SEC’s overall enforcement process and firms’ noncompliance behavior.  
We contribute to the literature by focusing on the violation of securities regulations that 
are unrelated to accounting matters as a proxy for noncompliance with non-accounting 
regulations. Then, we examine the association between this notion of noncompliance with non-
accounting securities regulations and the violation of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) to draw inferences about the interrelation between these two important aspects of 
noncompliance behavior. We posit that managers who are non-compliant with non-accounting 
regulations are also more likely to be non-compliant with accounting rules. 
The reasons why we expect a correlation between noncompliance with non-accounting 
regulations and GAAP violations are as follows. First, a firm’s accounting and compliance 
                                                          
1 Examples include Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996), deHaan, Kedia, Koh, and Rajgopal (2015), Files (2012), 




systems are built on common aspects of its internal culture reflecting elements such as integrity, 
ethical values, and tone at the top. We expect that a firm’s underlying compliance culture is 
likely to influence noncompliance with securities regulations and GAAP violations. Second, 
accounting and non-accounting compliance are interrelated because of the accounting system’s 
core function of recording economic activities. Since noncompliance with laws and regulations 
typically involves misrepresentation of economic reality including performance and value, this 
type of wrongdoing could be reflected in (or facilitated by) the accounting system. For example, 
a manager motivated to mislead investors would likely violate both GAAP and non-GAAP rules 
and regulations. In these cases, GAAP violations may be a natural consequence of the more 
primitive decision to violate securities regulations. Third, firm-level compliance with securities 
regulations and accounting rules are determined by the quality of prevailing internal controls that 
are designed to achieve related objectives including ensuring compliance with financial reporting 
rules, ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of operations, and ensuring compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations (Committee of Sponsoring Organisations, 2013). Specifically, 
accounting and compliance are affected by common characteristics of the firm’s internal control 
system such as resource constraints, management competence, and communication effectiveness. 
For example, fewer resources invested in internal control would likely adversely affect both 
securities regulation compliance and accounting quality (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, & Kinney, 
2007; Choi, Choi, Hogan, & Lee, 2013). Accordingly, we predict an association between weak 
compliance control and weak accounting control since both are determined by a common control 
system.  
The case of Sequenom Inc. provides an example of how noncompliance with securities 
regulations co-occurs with GAAP violations. During the period between June 2008 and January 
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2009, Sequenom made a series of announcements and filings regarding a prenatal screening test 
for Down syndrome suggesting the test was close to 100% accurate and would be ready for 
commercial use imminently. Sequenom’s stock price rose significantly as a result of these 
disclosures. However, it subsequently emerged that an officer of Sequenom’s R&D department 
had falsified test results. Following an internal investigation, Sequenom announced that the 
public could no longer rely on its past announcements regarding the test, leading to a 76% drop 
in the firm’s stock price. While we are unaware of evidence that accounting manipulation was 
necessitated by this disclosure of false information at that time, Sequenom subsequently restated 
its financial statements for the 2009, 2010, and 2011 fiscal years due to ‘material accounting 
classification errors and a material weakness in internal control over financial reporting’.2 The 
case provides anecdotal evidence about how non-accounting compliance and GAAP violations 
can co-occur.  
We investigate whether the incidence of noncompliance with non-accounting laws and 
regulations is associated with GAAP violations and if so, whether non-accounting 
noncompliance precedes or lags GAAP violations. Specifically, we examine whether firms that 
do not comply with non-accounting securities regulations enforced by the SEC (hereinafter 
‘noncompliant firms’) are more likely to violate GAAP, as reflected in accounting restatements.3 
We choose noncompliance with securities regulations as a setting in which to examine our 
research question for the following reasons.4 First, compliance with securities regulations 
                                                          
2 Administrative Proceedings No. 3-14524 (34-65247), filed on September 1, 2011. Restatement information comes 
from Sequenom’s 8-K filing on March 7, 2013. 
3 Similarly, we use the term ‘noncompliance sample’ to refer to the sample of firms with noncompliance with non-
accounting securities regulations, and ‘noncompliance events’ to refer to events violating non-accounting securities 
regulations. 
4 Violations leading to investigations by the SEC include: (1) misrepresentation or omission of important information 
about securities; (2) manipulating the market prices of securities; (3) stealing customers' funds or securities; (4) 
violating broker-dealers' responsibility to treat customers fairly; (5) insider trading (violating a trust relationship by 
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reflects an important aspect of firms’ compliance behavior because the costs of violations such as 
the loss of reputation and explicit penalties imposed by the SEC are substantial (Karpoff, Lee, & 
Martin, 2008a, 2008b). Second, securities regulations apply to all SEC registrants and therefore 
violations are generally investigated and enforced by a single regulatory body (the SEC).5 
Focusing exclusively on SEC enforcement actions therefore helps to ensure consistent regulatory 
authority across different firms and a degree of comparability across different industries. For 
example, the SEC implements the same regulations and has the same regulatory influence over 
an automobile firm and a pharmaceutical firm, whereas the two entities likely face very different 
industry standards, safety requirements, and are subject to different severity and frequency of 
monitoring scrutiny from other regulatory bodies (e.g., the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration for automobile firms and the Food and Drug Administration for pharmaceutical 
firms). Finally, the SEC makes information about its enforcement actions and firms’ wrongdoing 
publicly available, thereby facilitating the construction of a comprehensive sample of securities 
regulation noncompliance.  
We use SEC enforcement actions relating to non-accounting issues to proxy for 
noncompliance with securities regulations. We hand-collect data on SEC enforcement actions 
during the period 2003-2012. To avoid introducing a mechanical relation between non-
accounting-related SEC enforcement actions and GAAP violations, we exclude enforcement 
actions classified as Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) from our 
                                                          
trading while in possession of material and non-public information about a security); and (6) selling unregistered 
securities.  
5 We acknowledge that Department of Justice, private litigants, and some other parties may also levy claims under 
securities regulations, but the SEC holds primary responsibility for enforcing the federal securities laws, proposing 
securities rules, and regulating the securities industry, the nation's stock and options exchanges, and other activities 
and organizations including the electronic securities markets in the U.S. 
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securities regulation noncompliance sample.6 Furthermore, we review the content of releases for 
the resulting sample and exclude cases that could lead to subsequent GAAP violations such as 
option backdating and channel stuffing. We use propensity score matching (PSM) to construct a 
control sample of non-enforcement action firms based on observable firm characteristics that 
affect the likelihood of securities regulation noncompliance and accounting problems.  
We find that treatment firms that violate non-accounting securities regulations are more 
likely to restate financial statements relative to control firms that comply with securities 
regulations around the start of the noncompliance period. Examining the rate of accounting 
restatements separately for periods before and after the start of noncompliance events, we find 
that differences in GAAP violations between treatment and control firms are significant in the 
post-noncompliance period but not during the pre-noncompliance period. Our results indicate 
that prior to noncompliance with non-accounting regulations, treatment and control firms have 
equivalent GAAP violation rates, suggesting that our matching procedure successfully controls 
for the factors that influence low accounting quality. However, once firms violate non-
accounting securities regulations, they are also more likely to begin violating GAAP. Our results 
suggest that noncompliance behaviors unrelated to accounting issues precede GAAP violations 
and that noncompliance with securities regulations may be an important leading indicator of 
GAAP violations. 
In supplementary analysis, we examine the frequency of accounting restatements 
between treatment and control firms over multiple windows. We expect that multiple 
                                                          
6 AAER is a subcategory given by the SEC when enforcement actions or notices and orders are related to financial 
reporting issues. AAER is frequently used as a proxy for financial misrepresentation. If we do not exclude AAERs 
from our noncompliance sample, the noncompliance sample would include cases related to accounting matters, 
potentially leading to a mechanical relation between our noncompliance events and GAAP violations. After excluding 
AAERs based on the link to the original releases provided by the SEC, we manually re-check each of our final firms 
and further exclude five cases that are in fact in the AAER categories but are not properly linked to the original releases. 
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restatements over the period reflect more severe and systematic failings in the accounting system 
than a single restatement, and we therefore predict that noncompliant firms are more likely to 
report multiple restatements relative to control firms. Our results are consistent with this 
prediction, suggesting that noncompliance with securities regulations is related to more severe 
and systematic accounting problems as reflected in accounting restatements.  
Next, we test for differences in corporate governance arrangements between 
noncompliance and control firms. Levels tests suggest that noncompliant firms have weak 
corporate governance around noncompliance events, whereas a difference-in-differences test 
does not suggest significant changes in corporate governance arrangements between treatment 
and control firms. We therefore conclude that evidence suggesting that governance arrangements 
represent an important omitted variable in our analysis is weak, although we cannot rule out this 
possibility entirely. However, insofar as observable governance features are likely to correlate 
positively with internal control quality (Hoitash, Hoitash, & Bedard, 2009), evidence of weak 
governance for the treatment sample is perhaps not surprising and does not necessarily invalidate 
our conclusions. 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we construct a 
comprehensive and unique dataset of SEC non-accounting enforcement actions and provide new 
empirical evidence on noncompliance with U.S. securities regulations. While the SEC’s actions 
on accounting misrepresentation have formed the primary focus of research on its enforcement 
activities, other types of violations have received little attention in prior research. Our focus on 
SEC enforcement actions relating to non-accounting matters responds to Hayes’ (2015) call for a 
comprehensive approach to examining SEC’s enforcement actions.  
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Second, we contribute to research on compliance and accounting quality. Ours is one of 
the first studies to examine the association between compliance and accounting issues. In 
concurrent research, Kedia, Luo, and Rajgopal (2016) develop a comprehensive compliance 
index from firms’ violations relating to product safety, anti-trust issues, worker safety, worker 
civil rights, and environmental laws to examine the association between noncompliance culture 
and financial reporting risk. While their objective is to measure a firm’s overall culture of 
noncompliance, we study a specific type of noncompliance (i.e., violations of securities 
regulations) investigated and enforced mainly by a single regulatory body (the SEC) for a broad 
sample. Using a different research design and sample, our results complement Kedia et al. (2016) 
by enhancing our understanding of the interaction between compliance and accounting issues. 
Furthermore, our study extends the literature on the consequences of noncompliance by linking 
violations of securities regulations to GAAP violations (Jarrell & Peltzman, 1985; Jones & 
Rubin, 2001; Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Karpoff, Lott, & Wehrly, 2005; Mitchell & Maloney, 
1989; Murphy, Shrieves, &Tibbs, 2009; Peltzman, 1981).  
Finally, we provide empirical evidence on the link between the accounting and non-
accounting dimensions of internal control. Our evidence that noncompliance with securities 
regulations is associated with GAAP violations is consistent with the view of the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) (2013) that internal control is an integrated process in which 
accounting outcomes are determined not only by an entity’s control over its financial reporting 
but also by controls over its other business decisions. The tendency of extant research to focus 
exclusively on internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, 
Kinney, & LaFond, 2008; Bedard, Hoitash, Hoitash, & Westermann, 2012; Doyle, Ge, & 
McVay, 2007a) ignores the question of potential linkages between the different aspects of 
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internal control. Our results indicate that weaknesses in compliance control are leading indicators 
of weaknesses in accounting control, thereby highlighting the importance of viewing firms’ 
internal control arrangements as an integrated system. Our emphasis on the interrelation between 
multiple aspects of internal control is consistent with recent evidence suggesting that internal 
control weaknesses over financial reporting are related to poor control over operational decisions 
(Feng, Li, McVay, & Skaife, 2015; Cheng, Goh, & Kim, 2018).7  
Our study is subject to some caveats. Our main objective is to provide initial evidence on 
the general relation between non-accounting noncompliance and GAAP violations, and thus we 
do not examine whether specific types of noncompliance are related to specific misstatements. In 
addition, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that an SEC inquiry concerning non-
accounting noncompliance triggers subsequent restatements, or the announcement of 
restatements triggers the SEC investigation. However, despite these limitations, our results 
improve our collective understanding of the association between noncompliance and accounting 
quality.  
 
2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Compliance systems help firms meet their legal and regulatory obligations. Compliance is an 
important aspect of firms’ activities due to the high costs of noncompliance that include legal 
sanctions (e.g., legal costs, penalties, fines, and restrictions) and reputational losses (e.g., loss of 
expected cash flows due to lower sales and higher contracting and financing costs). Jarrell and 
                                                          
7 Rice and Weber (2012) find that the majority of earnings restatement firms and their auditors do not report existing 
control weaknesses during the misstatement period, highlighting a limitation of internal control deficiency (ICD) 
disclosures under SOX as a measure of the effectiveness of overall internal control. In our sample, we also find that 
few noncompliant firms report ICDs, consistent with the argument that ICD disclosures do not provide a complete 
picture on the effectiveness of a firm’s internal control system. A policy implication from our results is that reporting 
information about the effectiveness of compliance control could complement ICD disclosures under SOX in 
evaluating the quality of financial reporting (Dimmock & Gerken, 2012).  
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Peltzman (1985) suggest that when the party damaged by noncompliance is a related party (e.g., 
customer or investor), reputational penalties are particularly large because affected related parties 
revise the terms of trade. Examples of reputational penalties include loss of future sales in a 
customer fraud and an increase in the required return by investors following a misleading press 
release. Karpoff (2012) concludes that the loss of market value as a result of misconduct that 
imposes costs on noncompliance firms’ counterparties (e.g., investors, employees, customers, 
and suppliers) far exceeds the direct costs of noncompliance such as fines, penalties, and law-suit 
settlements.8  
Although compliance and accounting systems differ in their objectives, elements, and 
risk factors, we expect that noncompliance with non-accounting laws and regulations correlates 
with GAAP violations for several reasons. First, compliance with laws and regulations and 
compliance with GAAP are determined by a firm’s integrated internal control system. Internal 
control systems are intended to provide reasonable assurance regarding the effectiveness and 
efficiency of operations, the reliability of financial reporting, and compliance with applicable 
laws and regulations (COSO, 2013). Since a firm’s internal controls are built on common 
components, weaknesses in internal control affecting noncompliance with laws and regulations 
may also affect the accounting dimension of internal control. To the extent that the compliance 
and accounting aspects of internal control are achieved through common components (e.g., 
resource constraints, tone at the top, and competence of management), noncompliance with laws 
and regulations is expected to correlate with poor accounting quality as reflected in GAAP 
                                                          
8 Studies on noncompliance have examined various consequences of noncompliance including the effect of a firm’s 
noncompliance with environmental regulation (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Karpoff et al., 2005), false advertising 
(Peltzman, 1981), product recalls (Jarrell & Peltzman, 1985), fraud (Karpoff & Lott, 1993), and financial 
misrepresentation (Desai, Hogan, & Wilkins, 2006; Karpoff et al., 2008a) on firm’s reputation, market value, and 
CEO’s personal financial, reputational, and criminal risk. 
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violations (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007; Choi et al., 2013). Consistent with the interrelated 
nature of control systems, recent research reveals that operational decisions made based on weak 
internal control over financial reporting (hereinafter ICFR) lead to poor operational outcomes 
such as poor inventory management (Feng et al., 2015) and low operational efficiency (Cheng et 
al., 2018). 
Second, accountants may receive misleading information from other departments where 
noncompliance with securities regulations occurs. Since insiders typically misrepresent firm 
performance or value when they breach securities regulations, these violations may be reflected 
in accounting numbers as accounting systems record related transactions. In addition, insiders 
may intentionally manipulate accounting numbers to hide their fraudulent behavior. The case of 
Health Express USA illustrates one type of interaction between non-accounting noncompliance 
and GAAP violations. According to the auditor’s report, Health Express USA reported material 
weaknesses in ICFR relating to control over ‘non-accounting documents to the extent this 
information is communicated to the Chief Financial Officer’.9 The case indicates that failure of 
compliance control can be associated with poor control over financial reporting. We therefore 
predict that firms violating non-accounting laws and regulations are also more likely to violate 
GAAP.  
We may not find the predicted association between noncompliance and GAAP violations 
because they involve different procedures, individuals, and systems. For example, failure to 
disclose material information concerning an entity’s business and operations, disclosure of 
misleading forward-looking information, or market price manipulation may not correlate with 
GAAP violations because these behaviors do not necessarily require accounting 
                                                          
9 This example is from Doyle et al. (2007b).  
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misrepresentation to disguise the wrongdoing. Accordingly, this view suggests that a problem in 
one aspect of an entity’s internal control system does not necessarily imply problems in other 
aspects. 
In a related study, Karpoff et al. (2008b) report that most financial misrepresentation 
cases identified from SEC enforcement actions are also associated with other types of 
noncompliance behaviors including insider trading, civil and criminal fraud, and tax evasion. To 
the extent these other charges are associated with non-accounting issues, Karpoff et al.’s (2008b) 
descriptive evidence indicates that GAAP violations and noncompliance with non-accounting 
laws and regulations are closely related. However, our approach differs from theirs since we 
construct a comprehensive sample of cases where securities regulation violations are not 
mechanically related to accounting matters and then conduct a formal test of the relation between 
non-accounting noncompliance behavior and GAAP violations.  
While prior research finds that weakness in internal control is associated with poor 
financial reporting, the focus is primarily on ICFR. For instance, Doyle et al. (2007a) find that 
firms reporting internal control deficiencies (ICDs) under SOX exhibit lower accrual quality 
relative to control firms and that this relation is mainly attributable to company-level control 
weaknesses rather than to account-specific weaknesses. Consistent with this view, Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. (2008) find that accrual quality improves as firms remediate previously reported 
ICDs. Although these studies highlight the importance of internal control to ensure reliable 
financial reporting, their definition of internal control is limited to ICFR, thus ignoring other 
potentially important aspects of internal control. The focus on ICFR partly reflects regulations 
that require disclosure of the effectiveness of ICFR (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) 1977, 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 1991, SOX 2002), making data on 
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ICFR weaknesses readily available whereas data on other aspects of internal control are not 
easily accessible.  
Recent research also highlights a limitation of ICD reporting under SOX insofar as 
disclosures do not provide sufficient information to evaluate the overall effectiveness of firms’ 
internal control arrangements in a timely manner. Specifically, Rice and Weber (2012) find that 
only 32.4 percent of earnings restatement firms or their auditors report the existence of a material 
weakness in internal control during the misstatement period. This result suggests that ICD 
reporting under SOX is not fully effective in identifying existing control weaknesses and does 
not necessarily provide an early warning of accounting problems. We extend prior research by 
focusing on the securities regulation compliance aspect of internal control systems and by 
examining the implications of weaknesses therein for accounting quality as measured by GAAP 
violations.  
 
3. IDENTIFYING NONCOMPLIANCE WITH SECURITIES REGULATIONS 
AND GAAP VIOLATIONS 
3.1 Noncompliance with Securities Regulations 
The SEC maintains a searchable database of enforcement action activities from 1995 onwards. 
We collect information about two types of SEC enforcement actions in response to violations of 
securities regulations: (i) federal court actions and (ii) administrative proceedings. Information 
about federal court actions is disclosed in the form of litigation releases (hereinafter ‘LR’), while 
information about administrative proceedings such as orders and related materials are released 
when the SEC brings non-judicial actions before an administrative law judge (hereinafter 
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‘AP’).10 We begin with 10,923 enforcement action releases available on the SEC’s website for 
the period 2003-2012, from which we exclude cases that are classified as AAERs by the SEC,11 
those issued solely against individuals, those without a firm name in the release title, and other 
irrelevant releases.12 Applying these filters yields a sample of 3,754 releases relating to 4,129 
unique firms, for which we generate an index file containing firm names, related release 
numbers, filing dates, and the number of individuals involved. 
We identify CIK for each sample firm from EDGAR. We are able to match 2,417 firms 
with available CIK information from the initial sample of 4,129 firms. We use CIKs to match 
firms with COMPUSTAT data and retain 768 entities with available data for total assets.13 We 
review the 900 releases for these 768 firms and extract information for our analyses including 
filing date, the violation period, details of the laws and sections violated, and a description of the 
reason for the enforcement release. We exclude cases where firms do not file their periodic 
financial statements by the deadline date (known as delinquent filings) because these cases are 
                                                          
10 There are two additional types of enforcement actions: opinions issued by Administrative Law Judges in contested 
administrative proceedings (ALJ Decisions) and opinions issued by the Commission on appeals of Initial Decisions 
or disciplinary decisions issued by self-regulatory organizations such as the New York Stock Exchange or the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (Commission Opinions). Since these two types of actions are not original 
enforcement actions related to firms’ misconduct, we do not include them in our sample. 
11 If one enforcement action is designated to AAER, the SEC also discloses 'other release No(s).' associated with this 
AAER. Therefore, by tracing along 'other release No(s).', we are able to identify a non-accounting noncompliance 
sample that excludes AAERs issues.  
12 We collect noncompliance data from January 1, 2003 because (i) ICD data are available from 2003 when the Section 
302 of SOX was effective and (ii) restatement data from Audit Analytics are only available from 2001 and we require 
a two-year lag relative to the first noncompliance event for our tests. Our empirical models do not include ICD 
information disclosed under SOX because there are very few firms with ICDs in our noncompliance sample.  
13 Not every firm that files with the SEC is available on COMPUSTAT. Generally, COMPUSTAT’s North American 
population has financial data for companies filing public sources and having a trading issue, whereas COMPUSTAT 
adds private firms into the database only when they meet certain criteria such as the company trades on both U.S. and 
Canadian exchanges. The criteria for OTC to be added in the North American population are that the equity must be 
priced at least $0.01 and trading with reasonable volume must occur fairly consistently; in addition, the company must 
file sources regularly. We check the validity of our matching procedure by comparing results with those by Dechow, 
Ge, Larson, and Sloan (2011) who construct AAER dataset. Dechow et al. (2011) report that only 749 distinct firms 
are matched on CIK with total assets on COMPUSTAT (768 firms matched on GVKEY) during the period from 1982 
to 2015. We believe our matching results are reasonable considering AAERs form the largest fraction of enforcement 
releases issued by the SEC. 
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more likely to involve financial reporting problems than to non-accounting noncompliance. The 
resulting sample contains 532 releases (142 LRs and 390 APs) relating to 126 noncompliance 
events for 123 firms.14 We manually re-check each of our final firms and further exclude five 
cases that are in fact in the AAER categories but are not properly linked to the original releases 
on the SEC website. We also examine the content of releases for remaining sample firms and 
exclude any cases involving events that are likely to result in subsequent accounting restatements 
such as stock option backdating and channel stuffing. This process leads to the exclusion of a 
further 13 cases.15 Our final sample therefore comprises 108 noncompliance cases for 105 
unique firms. We provide a list of our noncompliance sample and a brief description of each case 
in an Appendix. Seventy-nine firms have data required for our PSM procedure. Table 1 describes 
the process of identifying relevant releases and noncompliant firms. 
Table 2 reports summary statistics for noncompliance events and the industry distribution 
of noncompliant firms. We provide information about our full noncompliance dataset prior to 
matching to provide a complete picture of our initial dataset of securities regulation 
noncompliance cases. Panel A of Table 2 describes the distribution of the 105 noncompliance 
events across calendar years based on the year when (i) the violation period begins and (ii) the 
violation period ends. Very few noncompliance events during our sample window are initiated 
prior to 1995 or after 2009, reflecting that our approach focuses on releases filed from 2003 
through 2012. The number of violations initiated between 1999 and 2003 is 63, accounting for 
60% of our noncompliance sample. The period 2004-2006 is also associated with a high 
proportion of enforcement actions (17%). 
                                                          
14 Note that multiple releases may pertain to one noncompliance event at a single firm, such as order instituting 
proceedings, initial decisions, and final decisions. 
15 Though SEC hasn’t classified them as AAERs and those cases do involve non-accounting noncompliance, to be 
rigorous, we exclude them from our sample. All our results remain robust if we include those cases in our sample. 
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 Panel B of Table 2 reports the industry distribution of the 105 noncompliant firms. 
Noncompliant firms cluster in the following sectors: Durable Manufacturers (19.05%), Banks & 
Insurance (19.05%), and Service (13.33%). However, comparing the composition of industries in 
our sample with the COMPUSTAT population indicates that only the Durable Manufacturers and 
Service sectors are associated with statistically abnormal noncompliance rates.  
Table 3 reports information on the duration of noncompliance events together with the 
laws and regulations that are violated. Panel A indicates that violation periods lasted less than 
1,000 days for approximately 67% of noncompliance events, while 21% of events are associated 
with a violation period between 1,000 and 2,000 days. The mean (median) value of the 
noncompliance event duration is 917 (516) days. Panel B reports the distribution of securities act 
violations. Most violation events involve the Securities Act of 1933 (44 out of 105 
noncompliance events or 41.9%) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (87 out of 105 
noncompliance events or 82.9%). The most common areas of noncompliance in our sample 
include misleading press releases, misleading disclosures on business activities, insider trading, 
foreign bribery, stock manipulation, unregistered securities, and related party transactions. 
Noncompliance may involve violating multiple sections of securities regulations. The average 
noncompliance event involves the violation of 2.2 subsections of securities regulations 
(untabulated). Panel C reports that 40 events involve violation of a single subsection, while the 
maximum number of violations is eight subsections (two cases). Panel D of Table 3 indicates that 
58.1% of our noncompliance sample involves the CEO, president or chairperson, while 9.52%, 
9.52%, and 16.19% of events involve general counsel, the CFO, or other top management, 
respectively. The evidence indicates that noncompliance with securities regulations typically 
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involves senior management, suggesting that tone at the top could be an important latent factor 
influencing all aspects of internal control. 
3.2 Identifying GAAP Violations 
Our measure of GAAP violations is an indicator for the presence of an accounting restatement. 
Data on accounting restatements are collected from Audit Analytics, which includes details of all 
SEC registrants disclosing at least one restatement of financial statements since 2001. Audit 
Analytics defines a restatement as a ‘revision of previously filed financial statements as a result 
of an error, GAAP failure, or fraud’. Technical revisions such as adjustments caused by mergers 
or changes in accounting principles are not considered as restatements involving errors or 
irregularities and hence are excluded by Audit Analytics. We further eliminate restatements due 
to the adoption of Interpretation No. 48 Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes – An 
Interpretation of FASB Statement No. 109 (FIN 48) or SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 108 
(SAB 108) because these cases are essentially changes in accounting principles. We collect 
information on the periods for which financial statements were restated (i.e., misstatement 
periods). 
  
4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Compliance is a management choice made after weighing the costs and benefits of 
noncompliance, rather than a random event and therefore our noncompliance sample is subject to 
selection bias (Robinson, Xue, & Yong, 2011). We address this problem using propensity score 
matching (PSM) to select a group of control firms with similar observable characteristics. Our 
matching procedure begins by identifying a group of potential control firms. As noncompliance 
behavior may span multiple years, we use the initial noncompliance date (d) as the starting point 
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for our matching process. For each noncompliance observation, we select all firms from 
COMPUSTAT in the same SIC industry and then require available financial data for years t – 3 
through t + 3. Firms that violated securities regulations at any point during the matching period 
are excluded from the pool of potential control matches. Specification of the PSM model 
involves a trade-off between efficiency and bias (see Augurzky & Schmidt, 2001; Brookhart et 
al., 2006; Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008; Tucker, 2010 for more details). There is a particular risk 
of over-parameterization in our setting since our noncompliance sample is small relative to the 
control population. We therefore focus on defining a comprehensive vector of variables predicted 
to affect the probabilities of both noncompliance and GAAP violations.16 Accordingly, we 
estimate propensity scores using the following model (time subscripts not reported to simplify 
notation): 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖) =  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
� = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 
    (1) 
+𝛽𝛽5𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓 𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒 
where the dependent variable is the natural log of the odds of the probability (p) of observable 
outcome y (y = one for noncompliant firms that violate non-accounting securities regulations and 
zero for control firms). We include return on assets (ROA) and an indicator variable for losses 
because Kim and Skinner (2012) find that poor performance increases the likelihood of 
managers’ engaging in aggressive actions that potentially lead to litigation. Moreover, weak 
performance is also found to be associated with GAAP violations and the quality of accounting 
control (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007; Dechow et al., 2011; Doyle, Ge, & McVay, 2007b; Files, 
2012; Kinney & McDaniel, 1989; Nagy, 2010; Rice & Weber, 2012; Thevenot, 2012). We 
                                                          
16 Results remain robust when we exclude book-market ratio and stock returns from the model. 
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include firm size because prior research finds its association with the probability of misconduct, 
enforcement actions, GAAP violations, and internal control problems. Following prior research 
on SEC enforcement actions (e.g., Kedia & Rajgopal, 2011) and debt-related earnings 
management (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1991; Abbott, Parker, & Presley, 2012), we also include 
leverage in equation (1) together with firm age because operating history is often treated as a 
financing risk factor (e.g., Hanley & Hoberg, 2012). We also include an indicator variable for 
Big N auditor status since prior research finds a positive association between litigation exposure 
and auditors’ incentives to provide high audit quality (Khurana & Raman, 2004; Schwartz & 
Soo, 1996; Venkataraman, Weber, & Willenborg, 2008). We also include book-to-market ratio 
and stock returns to control for market expectations and market-based performance, respectively. 
Year fixed effects are also included to control for temporal differences in securities regulation 
noncompliance suggested in Table 2, Panel A. 17 Variable definitions are provided in Table 4.  
We winsorize all continuous variables at their 1st and 99th percentiles. Conditional 
probabilities (propensity scores) of securities regulation noncompliance are calculated as the 
fitted value from equation (1). We use estimated propensity scores to match each noncompliant 
firm to a control firm in the same industry and calendar year with the closest propensity score 
(without replacement), subject to 0.5 calliper.  
 We analyse GAAP violations for noncompliance and control firms over a series of 
windows relative to the start of the noncompliance period for noncompliant firms (denoted d). 
We begin by examining the following four windows around the initiation of the noncompliance 
                                                          
17 While our choice of variables is to a degree ad hoc, it reflects extant research on compliance and financial reporting 
quality discussed in the main text. We note that some potentially important covariates may be missing. We therefore 
conduct the MHbounds test to evaluate the extent of selection bias due to unobservable factors.  
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event: years (-3, 3), (-2, 2), (-1, 1), and the start date of the noncompliance period (d).18 We also 
examine pre- and post-noncompliance periods separately for three windows prior to the initiation 
of noncompliance events [years (-3, -1), (-2, -1), and (-1)] and four windows subsequent to the 
start of the noncompliance period [(d, 3), (1, 3), (1, 2) and (1)]. Figure 1 illustrates how our 
GAAP violation windows are defined. 
We measure the ratio of GAAP violations separately for noncompliance and control firms 
during each violation window. For example, for the analysis of restatements over the six-year 
window (-3, 3), we calculate the number of treatment and control firms restating their financial 
statements at least once during entire window and divide them by the number of firms in each 
sample, respectively.19 This approach counts firm-level restatements once during a given 
violation window regardless of how many times the firm restates during the period. We refer to 
this approach as “firm-level” analysis in subsequent discussions. However, since reporting 
multiple restatements during a violation window could indicate a more severe and systematic 
accounting failure, we also examine the total number of individual restatements per firm. We 
refer to this approach as “restatement-level” analysis in subsequent discussions. 
 
5. RESULTS 
5.1 Logistic regression results for PSM  
Panel A of Table 4 reports the estimation results for the logistic model used to generate 
propensity scores for matching. Results indicate that firms are more likely to violate securities 
                                                          
18 Strictly, d is a discrete event date representing the start of the noncompliance period rather than a window. 
Misstatements occurring on date d are excluded from the definition of all pre- and post-compliance years except for 
window (d, 3). We treat d separately and report results for exclusively d to address concerns that noncompliance and 
GAAP violations might be capturing the same event with the same date of initiation. 
19 We count accounting restatements initiated in any year of the windows and therefore we avoid double counting 
cases where accounting restatements span multiple years.  
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regulations if they are larger (SIZE), performing poorly (ROA), audited by non-Big N auditors 
(BIGN), and young (AGE). The positive coefficient on stock returns (STOCKRET) is consistent 
with the evidence in Dechow et al. (2011), where they find “strong stock return performance in 
the years prior to misstatement.”  
Panel B of Table 4 reports the distribution of propensity scores for the noncompliance 
sample (N = 79) and the potential control group in the same industry and year (N = 19,066) prior 
to matching. Comparing the two distributions indicates that noncompliant firms and potential 
control firms differ significantly in the probability of noncompliance before matching, 
highlighting the importance of the matching procedure. 
5.2 Validity of PSM 
The application of PSM is invalid if only treatment firms are observable at a given propensity 
score (and thus it is not possible to select a control firm with a given score), and if the 
distributions of covariates are not similar for the treatment and control groups after matching 
(Tucker, 2010). We therefore first exclude treatment observations whose propensity scores are 
higher than the maximum or less than the minimum propensity scores of the potential control 
group. Imposing this condition results in a loss of two observations from the noncompliance 
sample. Subsequent empirical analyses are therefore based on 77 noncompliant firms and 77 
control firms. We follow Caliendo and Kopeinig’s (2008) suggestion to use several measures to 
assess the matching quality in terms of covariate balance, including standardized bias, a two-
sample t-test, joint significance, Wilcoxon test, and Pseudo-R2. We apply these tests to the 
samples before and after matching, and report results in Table 5.  
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 report the mean value of each covariate for the 
noncompliance and control groups, respectively, before and after matching. Column 3 presents 
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the standardized bias for each covariate in the pre-matching and post-matching samples, while 
column 4 presents the percentage reduction in covariate bias.20 The t-tests reported in columns 5 
and 6 are the parametric tests of differences in the mean values between the samples, while the 
Wilcoxon tests reported in columns 7 and 8 provide nonparametric comparisons.21 The t-test 
results indicate that while the means of ROA, LEVERAGE, BIGN, AGE, BM and STOCKRET are 
significantly different between the two samples prior to matching, all covariates are statistically 
indistinguishable after matching. Following Peel and Makepeace (2012), we evaluate the quality 
of matching by considering the standardized bias less than ±10% after matching as acceptable. 
As presented in column 3, all the covariates are very close to this criterion after matching with 
the exception of LOSS and AGE, which have a standardized bias of 20.80% and -22%, 
respectively. We re-examine the bias for firm age after replacing logged values with raw values 
and find that the bias in the post-matching samples is small at -6.8%, which is acceptable. Paired 
Wilcoxon tests indicate that none of the covariates differ significantly after matching. 
The pseudo R2 from equation (1) is reported in the lower part of Table 5. The value 
declines from 10.7% before matching to 5.2% after matching. The low pseudo-R2 for the post-
matching regression is consistent with the argument that there should be no systematic 
differences in the distribution of covariates between the two samples after matching (Caliendo & 
Kopeinig, 2008). In addition, the likelihood ratio test on the joint significance of all regressors in 
the logistic model is rejected for the pre-matching sample but is not rejected for the post-
matching sample, suggesting that the quality of matching is good. Collectively, results in Table 5 
                                                          
20  For each covariate, the standardized bias is defined as the difference in the sample means between the 
noncompliance and control samples as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in both 
samples. 
21 As Wilcoxon tests presented in columns 7-8 are for the differences in matched pairs, there is no statistics presented 
for unmatched groups.  
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indicate that the matched samples display similar observable characteristics as a result of the 
PSM approach. 
5.3 GAAP violations between the noncompliance and control groups 
We report the results comparing firm-level GAAP violation rates for noncompliance and 
control firms in Table 6, where restatement is a binary outcome that takes the value of one 
regardless of how many restatements a firm reports during the event period. We report 
restatement rates (%) for noncompliance and control samples for eleven different windows, 
along with results of Fisher's exact test for differences between the two groups.22 For windows (-
3, 3), (-2, 2), (-1, 1) and (d), restatement rates for the noncompliance sample are 14.29%, 
14.29%, 10.39% and 1.30%, respectively. Corresponding restatement rates for the control sample 
are 7.79%, 5.19%, 3.9% and 0%, respectively. With the exception of date d (noncompliance 
period start date), differences are statistically significant at either 5% or 10% significance levels. 
The lack of significance for date d corroborates the absence of a higher incidence of restatements 
on the start date of the noncompliance period, thereby reducing concern that restatements form 
an integral part of the noncompliance event. 
Next, we examine firm-level restatement rates separately for periods prior to the initiation 
of noncompliance events and subsequent to the initiation of noncompliance events. For windows 
(-3, -1), (-2, -1), and (-1) prior to the initiation of noncompliance events, restatement rates for 
noncompliance and control groups are statistically indistinguishable. Conversely, restatement 
rates for post-event windows (d, 3), (1, 3), (1, 2), and (1) are all statistically higher for 
noncompliant firms relative to control firms.23 The contrasting results for windows before and 
                                                          
22 We use a Fisher’s exact test rather than a Chi-squared test because the latter requires each cell to have an expected 
frequency of five or more and we observe several cells with frequency of less than five in our sample. 
23 Window (d, 3) includes the first day of noncompliance period, while other post-noncompliance windows (1,3), (1,2), 
(1) are measured from one day after the noncompliance start date. 
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after the noncompliance start date suggest that noncompliance with securities regulations tends 
to precede GAAP violations rather than vice versa. The lack of differences in restatement rates 
for pre-noncompliance windows also suggests that our matching process successfully identifies 
control firms facing a similar likelihood of accounting problems prior to the start of the 
noncompliance period. Subsequent to violations of non-accounting securities regulations, 
however, restatement rates begin to diverge as noncompliant firms engage in more GAAP 
violations. Our results highlight the potential importance of noncompliance behavior unrelated to 
accounting issues as a leading indicator for GAAP violations.  
Table 7 reports results for our restatement-level analysis where we count the total number 
of restatements reported, conditional on at least one restatement occurring. Specifically, Panel A 
of Table 7 reports percentages of firms in the treatment and control samples reporting one, two, 
three, or four restatements for windows around the noncompliance beginning day, while Panels 
B and C report the results for the pre- and post-noncompliance windows, respectively. This 
approach reflects the view that multiple misstatements over an event window indicate a more 
severe and systematic accounting problems. Results indicate that noncompliant firms are more 
likely to report multiple restatements relative to control firms and that this higher propensity is 
more pronounced in the post-compliance periods. For example, for window (1, 3) reported in 
Panel C, 33% of noncompliant firms that restate report two restatements, while no restating 
control firms report more than one restatement. Results in Table 7 support the evidence 
presented in Table 6 and corroborate the notion that firms characterized by securities regulation 
noncompliance tend to display higher rates of accounting problems and that these accounting 
problems are more likely to occur after the start of noncompliance events. 
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Evidence that GAAP violations tend to occur after the start of noncompliance events 
raises the possibility that non-accounting noncompliance and misstatements are capturing the 
same underlying event; or that an SEC inquiry concerning non-accounting noncompliance 
mechanically triggers subsequent restatements; or that a restatement announcement triggers an 
SEC investigation leading to identification of retrospective noncompliance behavior. To address 
these concerns, we present Figure 2 illustrating the typical sequence in our sample of four related 
events (i.e., noncompliance with securities regulations, accounting misstatements, 
announcements of restatements, filings of non-accounting enforcement actions) and their 
timeline. Figure 2.A presents a timeline of an actual case whose time lag between the filing date 
of the non-accounting enforcement action and the announcement date of restatements equals the 
sample median time lag (601 days). The figure also provides a timeline of the noncompliance 
event period and the misstatement period. Several results are apparent from this case. First, the 
four events typically occur at very different points in time with long time lags between each one, 
suggesting that it is unlikely that non-accounting noncompliance and accounting restatements 
reflect the same underlying event. Second, with respect to the sequence of events, 
noncompliance with non-accounting regulations occurs first, followed by GAAP violations, 
announcements of restatements, and filings of enforcement actions. The evidence helps mitigate 
concern that SEC enforcement actions automatically trigger announcement of restatements. 
Instead, the results are consistent with the interpretation of our main results that noncompliance 
with securities regulations precedes (unrelated) GAAP violations. Third, the time lag between a 
restatement announcement and the enforcement action filing date is relatively long (601 days), 
making it unlikely that SEC investigations are triggered by restatement events.  
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For completeness, Figure 2.B presents the timeline for representative composite case 
constructed using sample median values of several time lags and durations of events. For the 
median case, the misstatement period starts 198 days after the start of noncompliance with 
securities regulations, and the typical length of the period of noncompliance with securities 
regulations (accounting misstatements) is 395 (1,001) days. Consistent with Figure 2.A, the 
timeline for this representative case suggests neither significant overlap between noncompliance 
and GAAP violation events nor the SEC’s scrutiny of one event automatically leading to the 
other event.  
Collectively, our results suggest that noncompliant firms display a significantly higher 
likelihood of violating GAAP in the post-noncompliance periods relative to a control sample of 
compliant firms, and that noncompliant firms are also more likely to report multiple 
restatements.  
5.4 Robustness to matching method 
To check the robustness of our results to our matching strategy, we repeat the firm-level analysis 
using a 1:N nearest matching approach (with replacement and a maximum calliper distance of 
0.5), where N is set equal to 2 or 3 control firms in the same industry and year.24 Table 8 reports 
results for both the 1:2 match (74 noncompliant firms are matched) and the 1:3 match (71 
noncompliant firms are matched). The results are entirely consistent with those reported in Table 
6 using a 1:1 match. Noncompliant firms are significantly more likely to report GAAP violations 
                                                          
24 As we increase the number of control firms matched (i.e., 1:2, 1:3, and 1:4 matches), standardized biases for 
covariates increase. For example, while the standardized biases for most covariates remain close to acceptable levels 
(i.e., ±10%) for the 1:1 match, more covariates (i.e., ROA and LEVERAGE) show high levels of standardized bias (-
22.3% and 14.9%, respectively) for the 1:4 match. Furthermore, the sample size that can be matched decreases to 67 
for the 1:4 match. As a result, we do not report results for the 1:4 matching strategy in Table 8. 
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relative to the control sample, and this difference is confined to post-noncompliance windows. 
(Results not tabulated for pre-noncompliance windows.) 
5.5 MHBounds test  
While PSM addresses selection bias due to observable factors, it does not alleviate selection bias 
due to unobservable factors (Tucker, 2010). If unobserved variables exist that simultaneously 
affect selection into both noncompliance with securities regulations and GAAP violation states, 
then hidden bias may lead to the estimated treatment effects in Tables 6 and 7 being 
overestimated. To address this possibility, we report results for a bounding analysis proposed by 
Rosenbaum (2002) to test how strongly any unobserved variable(s) would need to influence the 
selection process to undermine the implications of the matching analysis. Specifically, we 
implement the MHbounds test in Stata using the Becker and Caliendo (2007) algorithm.  
The MHbounds technique allows us to gauge the impact that potential hidden bias has on 
the matched treatment effect with reference to a parameter Γ. When Γ = 1 it is assumed that the 
treatment effect is free from bias. Where Γ = 2, firms that appear to be similar (in terms of 
matching covariates) may differ in their odds of receiving the treatment by a factor of up to 2; 
and so on, with higher values of Γ indicating greater deviations from ‘randomised distribution’. 
To assess the extent to which this deviation affects the inference from significant treatment 
effects, we use the Mantel and Haenszel (1959) test statistic (𝑄𝑄𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀), which compares the 
successful number of cases in the treatment group with the same expected number, assuming that 
the treatment effect is zero (Aakvik, 2001). The test statistic, 𝑄𝑄𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀, is bounded by two known 
distributions, 𝑄𝑄𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀+  and 𝑄𝑄𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀−  (Rosenbaum 2002), where 𝑄𝑄𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀+  (𝑄𝑄𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀− ) is the test statistic since the 
treatment effect is overestimated (underestimated). When  Γ = 1, the two bounds are equal, and 
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there is no hidden bias. With increasing  Γ, the bounds move apart reflecting uncertainty about 
the test statistics in the presence of unobserved selection bias.25  
We calculate the 𝑄𝑄𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 test statistic for the outcomes associates with each post-
noncompliance window displaying a significant noncompliance effect in our 1:1 matching test. 
For example, Panel A of Table 9 presents the MHbounds statistics for the estimation effects for 
the three-year window (d, 3), along with the key parameters highlighted in bold. Because we 
estimate positive treatment effects, our focus is on the upper bound (𝑄𝑄𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀+ ) in column 1 and its 
significance level (𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚ℎ+ ) in column 3. Results suggest that for this window and under the 
assumption of no hidden bias (Γ=1), there exists a significant noncompliance effect (𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚ℎ+ =
0.004). Accordingly, at the 10% significance level, hidden bias from a confounding variable 
would need to increase the odds to 1.4 times (Γ = 1.4) the odds of exposure to noncompliance 
(based on the covariates incorporated in the PSM model) to affect the estimation of 
noncompliance effects. 
Since our prime interest is the critical MHbounds parameters (Γ) at which the estimated 
noncompliance effect becomes questionable, Panel B of Table 9 reports critical values of Γ (i.e., 
the values at which the noncompliance effects are no longer statistically significant) at the 5 and 
10% significance levels for windows displaying significant differences across the two groups. As 
reported in column 1 (p = 10%), across all the windows, the smallest value of Γ is 1.2 for 
window (1, 3). This means that after controlling for observed bias using PSM, an unobserved 
confounding variable would have to increase the likelihood of selection into the noncompliance 
sample by 20% to render reported inferences invalid. For all other windows, an unobserved 
                                                          
25 Note that the bounding approach does not test the conditional independence assumption itself because this would 
amount to testing that there are no (unobserved) variables that influence selection into treatment sample. Instead, the 
bounding approach provides evidence about the degree to which any significant results hinge on the untestable 
assumption of conditional independence (Becker & Caliendo, 2007). 
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confounding variable would need to increase the likelihood of selection into the noncompliance 
sample by more than 20% to render results spurious. Since model (1) controls for broad set of 
observable factors, we believe that biases of this magnitude are unlikely. While the MHbounds 
test cannot directly justify the conditional independence assumption of PSM, it nevertheless 
provides some comfort regarding the reliability of our results and conclusions.  
5.6 The effect of corporate governance  
Prior research finds evidence suggesting that corporate governance characteristics such as board 
size and board structure may be important factors affecting GAAP violations (Agrawal & 
Chadha, 2005; Hazarika, Karpoff, & Nahata, 2012). However, Kim and Skinner (2012) report 
that corporate governance quality adds little to the predictive ability for securities litigation risk. 
We next examine whether differences in corporate governance mechanisms between our 
noncompliance and control samples explain noncompliance and restatement behaviors. 
Specifically, we collect data on a vector of corporate governance characteristics including board 
size, size of key committees (audit committee, compensation committee, and nomination 
committee), CEO duality, and whether the board is staggered. We collect governance data 
manually from firms’ proxy statements and 10-Ks (or 10-KSBs for small business issuers).26 We 
also collect data on whether board members have legal backgrounds since Krishnan, Wen, and 
Zhao (2011) find that the presence of directors with legal expertise enhances financial reporting 
quality. In addition, directors with legal expertise might respond differently to noncompliance 
than those lacking this type of expertise due to differences in their perception of legal risk 
(Langevoort, 2007).  
                                                          
26 We also experimented with governance data obtained from BoardEx and Riskmetrics. However, only 20% of our 
noncompliant firms are covered by BoardEx. Similar low coverage rates are also apparent for Riskmetrics.   
31 
 
We conduct the following two tests. First, we examine whether there are significant 
differences in the levels of observed corporate governance arrangements between noncompliance 
and control samples. Second, we apply a difference-in-differences approach based on changes in 
governance characteristics between the pre- and post-noncompliance periods to determine 
whether changes in corporate governance arrangements is an underlying factor affecting 
noncompliance behavior. 
Panel A of Table 10 reports results for paired differences in governance features between 
noncompliance and control firms for two years before and after the initiation year of 
noncompliance events. Results indicate that noncompliant firms and control firms are similar in 
most corporate governance aspects. Nevertheless, several differences in the pre- and post-
noncompliance period are apparent. Specifically, relative to their control counterparts, 
noncompliant firms are more likely to have staggered boards and smaller audit committees, and 
the CEO is more likely to chair the board. The results point to noncompliant firms having weaker 
governance arrangements and thus facing fewer constraints on noncompliance behavior.  
To examine the changes in corporate governance arrangements, we calculate the 
difference in governance variables from years t-1 and t+1, where year t is the beginning year of 
the noncompliance event period. Columns 1 and 2 of Panel B report t-tests for changes in 
governance measures between the pre- and post- noncompliance periods for noncompliance and 
control samples, respectively. Column 3 reports paired t-test results for changes in corporate 
governance between noncompliance and control samples. Results reported in columns 1 and 2 
provide little evidence of significant changes in corporate governance arrangements for both the 
noncompliance and control samples. Further, difference-in-differences results presented in 
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column 3 indicate that changes in corporate governance variables do not differ significantly 
between the noncompliance and control samples.  
Collectively, the results reported in Table 10 suggest that noncompliance sample firms 
display lower quality arrangements for a subset of governance features. However, no differences 
are apparent for changes in governance arrangements surrounding the start of the noncompliance 
period. Furthermore, to the extent that corporate governance is positively associated with internal 
control quality (Hoitash et al. 2009), evidence of weaker governance arrangements for 
noncompliance firms is not inconsistent with our view that systemic internal control weaknesses 
affect both noncompliance with securities regulations and GAAP violations. Nevertheless, these 
results indicate that we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that externally-focused governance 
arrangements represent an omitted variable in our tests. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
We examine the association between noncompliance with securities regulations and GAAP 
violations to draw inferences about whether noncompliance with securities regulations has 
implications for GAAP violations. We hypothesize that general factors that affect the 
effectiveness of the integrated internal control system are likely to simultaneously affect both 
compliance behavior and accounting systems. Therefore, we predict and find that the likelihood 
of GAAP violations is higher for firms that violate securities regulations compared to a control 
sample matched on observable characteristics at the noncompliance date. In addition, the 
differences between the noncompliant and control firms are significant for the periods 
subsequent to the start of the noncompliance period but not for periods prior to this date. The 
results suggest that once noncompliance behavior begins, firms are also more likely to engage in 
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GAAP violations. These results are important because they are consistent with the view that 
firms’ internal control arrangements form part of an integrated system. 
Our study has a number of limitations, some of which merit further research. First, while 
we find the association between noncompliance with securities regulations and GAAP violations, 
our data and research design do not allow us to directly test causality. Second, we focus on the 
violation of securities regulations as a setting for noncompliance. Future research can explore 
whether the associations that we find hold for other types of noncompliance behavior. Third, it is 
possible that monitoring intensity by the SEC increases once a noncompliance event is detected, 
thereby increasing the likelihood of the restatement of previous misstatements. Our analysis 
indicates that restatement announcements precede the SEC enforcement action filing date by 601 
days for the median sample firm, suggesting that this scenario is less plausible. However, we 
acknowledge that SEC scrutiny could introduce a potential bias because our data are based on 
observed and detected outcomes. Finally, auditors’ response to known noncompliance behavior 
(e.g., exerting more effort) may affect our results. We leave the investigation of auditors’ 





The List of Noncompliance Events 
 Company Name Brief Description of Event 
1 Value Line Inc Misappropriated assets 
2 National Presto 
Industries Inc 
Operating as an unregistered investment company 
3 Daxor Corp An unregistered investment company to offer for sale 
4 General Electric Co Failed to fully and accurately disclose CEO compensation 
5 Pennichuck Corp False and misleading disclosures in operation 
6 Online Power Supply 
Inc 
Unregistered stock transactions; false and misleading statements  
7 China Fruits Corp Acting as unregistered investment adviser 
8 Tyson Foods Inc Misleading disclosures of perquisites and personal benefits for its president, CEO 
and chairman; failed to maintain adequate internal controls over his personal use 
of company assets and the disclosure of those perquisites in its proxy statements. 
9 Revolutions Medical 
Corp 
False or misleading statements about company and product 
10 Syndicated Food 
Service International 
Inc 
Broker bribery scheme 
11 Verint Systems Inc Improper practice in IPO; inefficient internal control system 
12 Competitive 
Technologies Inc 
Manipulate and fraudulently inflate the price of stock  
13 Integral Systems Inc 
/Md/ 
Failed to disclose an executive officer's securities fraud background in its periodic 
reports and proxy statements 
14 Nicor Inc Improper transactions, material misrepresentations, and failed to disclose material 
information regarding gas inventory  




Manipulating stock price 
17 Save The World Air 
Inc 
False and materially misleading information about products, business and revenue 
records 
18 Ford Motor Credit Co 
Llc 
Unlawful marketing of securities 
19 Hartcourt Companies 
Inc 
Illegally raise money by using a Form S-8 registration statement; false and 
misleading press releases 
20 Wi-Tron, Inc. False and misleading statements concerning purported entry into the high-speed 
Internet wireless access market 
21 Gilman Ciocia, Inc. Fraudulent conduct in the offer, sale and purchase of securities 
22 Packetport.Com, Inc. Pump and Dump stock price 
23 Entrade Inc Pink sheet failed to file periodic filings 
24 Fiat S P A Foreign bribery 
25 Cnh Global N V Foreign bribery 
26 Rica Foods Inc CEO self-dealing in operation resulting in millions of dollars in related-party 
transactions 
27 Natures Sunshine 
Products Inc 
Foreign bribery 
28 Agco Corp /De Foreign bribery 
29 Lnb Bancorp Inc Manipulation stock price  




31 Intervoice Inc Misleading statements 
32 Nano World Projects 
Corp 
False and misleading statements concerning business 
33 Westwood Holdings 
Group Inc 
Fraudulent stock offering 
34 Tasty Fries Inc Unregistered Sales of Securities; false and misleading fillings and press releases 
35 Textron Inc Foreign bribery –kickback 





37 Wulf International 
Ltd 
Misleading press releases concerning business  
38 Tristar Corp Pink sheet failed to file periodic filings 
39 Universal Express 
Inc/ 
Illegal distribution of stock to public; false and misleading statements about 
funding commitments for the company and its business 
40 Chevron Corp Foreign bribery 
41 El Paso Corp/De Foreign bribery 
42 Stansbury Holdings 
Corp 
Failed to disclose significant events and periodic filings 
43 Freedom Golf 
Corp/Nv 
Fraudulent projections; failed to disclose material information 
44 Softnet Technology 
Corp. 
Small cap unregistered distribution of stock 
45 Bgi Inc Noncompliance with game laws; misleading statements 
46 Xaibe Inc False and Misleading Statements about purported audited financial statements 
47 Pacel Corp Fraudulent form S-8 transactions 
48 Siebel Systems Inc Selectively disclosing material nonpublic information to certain persons-
securities analysts, broker-dealers, investment advisers and institutional investors-
before disclosing the same information to the public.  
49 KIT Digital, Inc. Small cap unregistered distribution of stock 
50 Veridigm, Inc. Material misrepresentations and omissions concerning business 
51 Dean Holding Co Misleading side letters as suppliers to an earning overstatement firm 
52 Hutech21 Co. Ltd. Violations of the transfer agent rules; false filings with the SEC 
53 Energy & Engine 
Technology Corp 
Small cap unregistered distribution of stock 
54 Applied Minerals, 
Inc. 
Improper offer and sale of securities; internal control deficiencies 
55 Amerco /Nv/ No detailed information; SEC issued a formal order of private investigation  
56 Eknowledge Group 
Inc 
False and Misleading Statements of business 




58 Intrepid Holdings, 
Inc. 
Materially misleading press releases concerning acquisition of a multi-million 
dollar loan portfolio, revenue, loan 
59 Statoil Asa Foreign bribery 
60 Jb Oxford Holdings 
Inc 
Facilitating late trading and market timing 
61 Ab Watley Group Inc Participated in a fraudulent scheme to trade ahead of large institutional orders 
62 Converge Global 
Inc/Ca 
False release concerning business 
63 Sei Investments Co Ineffectively control of wholly owned subsidiary 
64 Merck & Co. Inc. Disclose material, non-public information regarding earnings prospects to 
institutional investors and analysts 
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65 Concentrax Inc False and misleading claims regarding purported contracts to sell products; 
misleading earnings projections 
66 Flowserve Corp Selectively disclosing material, non-public information to certain persons outside 
the issuer. 
67 Orthofix International 
N V 
Foreign bribery 
68 Rocky Mountain 
Energy Corp 




False and misleading press releases on biotech products and business 
opportunities 
70 Us Global Nanospace 
Inc 
Materially misleading press releases regarding products and business 
71 Anscott Industries Inc Microcap, a fraudulent touting scheme of stock 
72 Bennett 
Environmental Inc 
False and misleading information concerning a contract 
73 Vaso Active 
Pharmaceuticals Inc 
Material misrepresentations and omissions concerning business in both public 
statements and filings with 
74 Biopure Corp Misleading public statements about products 
75 Tyson Foods Inc Foreign bribery 
76 Bio One Corp Amended registration statement failed to include information for acquired 
businesses 
77 Starinvest Group, Inc. Multiple violation of Regulation on Business Development Companies 
78 Stockeryale Inc False and misleading press releases concerning business 
79 Inspire 
Pharmaceuticals Inc 
Misleading disclosures of products'(drug's)efficiency 
80 Aero Performance 
Products, Inc. 
Multiple violation of Regulation on Business Development Companies 
81 Oretech Inc Failed to report certain significant events 
82 Deutsche Telekom 
Ag 
Foreign bribery 
83 Magyar Telekom Plc. Foreign bribery 
84 Kings Road 
Entertainment Inc 
Pink sheet failed to file periodic filings 
85 American Equity 
Investment Life 
Holding Co 
Misleading disclosure of a related-party transaction in proxy statement 
86 Advanced Optics 
Electronics Inc 
Unlawful public offering of the securities 
87 Hst Global, Inc. Penny stock; illegal unregistered stock distributions 
88 Lilly Eli & Co Foreign bribery 
89 4d Seismic Inc Unregistered transactions; materially false press releases  
90 Rbc Capital Markets, 
Llc 
Improper offer or sale of securities 




Fraudulent market manipulation scheme 
93 Presstek Inc /De/ Selectively disclosed material non-public information to a managing partner of a 
registered investment adviser 
94 Bbx Capital Corp Misleading statements in public filings and earnings calls regarding the 
deteriorating state of business 






Misleading/insufficient disclosure of investment products 
97 Acorn Energy, Inc. Fraudulent offer and sale of unregistered securities 
98 Sequenom Inc Misleading press releases/filings of scientific data regarding a prenatal screening 
test 
99 Nyse Euronext Inadequate compliance efforts/fail to record business/inefficient control of 
subsidiary 
100 Sunrise Solar Corp Manipulating Stock price; misleading press releases 
101 Earthworks 
Entertainment Inc 
Microcap :insiders or promoters of publicly traded microcap companies, sought 
to manipulate the volume and price of microcap stocks and to generate stock sales 
through the payment of illegal kickbacks 
102 China Intelligent 
Lighting & 
Electronics, Inc. 
Registration Statements were materially deficient and included an untrue 
statement of a material fact. 
103 China Century 
Dragon Media, Inc. 
Registration Statements were materially deficient and included an untrue 
statement of a material fact. 
104 Wfc Holdings Corp Failed to produce documents in Mortgage-Backed Securities Investigation 
105 Axius Inc. Penny stock, fraudulent broker bribery scheme designed to manipulate the 
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Notes: This figure illustrates how we identify misstatements occurrence across different windows. We identify misstatements occurrence for noncompliance and 
control firms over a series of windows relative to the start of the noncompliance period for noncompliant firms. d is the date when noncompliance initiated. (-3, -
1), (-2, -1), and (-1) represent pre-noncompliance windows until one day before d for the periods of 3 years, 2 years and 1 year, respectively. (1, 3), (1, 2) and (1) 
represent post-noncompliance windows starting one day after d for the periods of 3 years, 2 years and 1 year, respectively. The occurrence of misstatements that 
occurred on the dates that noncompliance start are not counted for these pre- and post- compliance windows but only reflected in (d).  
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Figure 2.A. Timeline of  a real SEC non-accounting noncompliance case and the restatement associated with it  
 
Notes: This figure represents a timeline for an actual case whose time lag between the filing date of the non-accounting enforcement action and the 
announcement date of restatements equals the sample median value, i.e. 601 days. It also presents the timeline of noncompliance event period and 
misstatement period. ‘Gap=579 days’ represents the time lag between the date when the noncompliance event was initiated and the start date of accounting 


































(ii) Non-accounting Noncompliance 
period (395 days) 





noncompliance filing date 
(iv) Gap=601 days 
(i) Gap=198 days 
Figure 2.B. Timeline of a representative case constructed based on several median values  
Notes: This figure represents a timeline for a representative case that we construct using the sample median values of several time lags and durations of events; (i) the 
median time lag between the initiation of noncompliance event and the starting date of accounting misstatement is 198 days; (ii) the median duration of noncompliance 
events is 395 days; (iii) the median duration of misstatement periods is 1,001 days; and (iv) the median time lag between the announcement of restatements and the 
filing of noncompliance enforcement action is 601 days.  
45 
 
Table 1  Sample Selection of Enforcement Action Releases 
Panel A: Sample selection of Enforcement Action Releases 
Number of Releases 
Total releases (2003-2012) 10,923 
        Total_LR (2003-2012) 4,675 
        Total_AP (2003-2012) 6,248 
       less: releases towards individual and categorized as AAER 5,904 
       less: other releases 1,212 
Indexed releases (4,129 unique firms) 3,754 
Panel B: Sample selection of firms against by Enforcement Actions  
Number of Firms 
Number of firms referred by indexed releases 4,129 
Number of firms found in EDGAR 2,417 
Number of firms with 'total assets' information on Compustat, corresponding to 900 releases 768 
Number of firms after deleting releases against firms delinquent in financial reports  123 
  (corresponding to 532 releases about 126 events)  
Number of firms after deleting re-examination of AAER category and potential GAAP-related events  118 
Number of firms after deleting cases of stock option backdating 105* 
Number of firms with all available financial data for PSM regression 79 
Note  
This table reports the process of identifying non-GAAP related SEC’s enforcement actions releases. 
Total releases: the sum of SEC's enforcement releases in each year for the period from 2003 to 2012. 
Indexed releases: the number of SEC's enforcement releases covered in our index file. 
Other Releases: the number of releases which are not relevant for identifying firms' non-compliance behaviors, such as releases for 
fair fund distributions, and which don't specify all the firms' names in the release titles. 
*Those cases arguably involve accounting restatements, though the cases collected are not subcategorized as AAERs. All the results 




Table 2 Summary Statistics for Frequency of Noncompliance Events and Noncompliant Firms by Year and Industry 
Panel A: Year Frequency of Noncompliant Firms  Panel B: Industry Frequency of Noncompliant Firms 
Vio_Beg Freq Vio_End Freq  Industry Frequency Percent Compustat 
1986 1     Banks&Insurance 20 19.05 20.13 
1994 1     Chemicals  7 6.66 1.84 
1995 1     Computers 7 6.67 11.18 
1996 5 1996 1  Durable Manufacturers 20 19.05 11.24 
1997 3     Food&Tobacoo 5 4.76 1.93 
1998 1     Mining &Construction 3 2.85 11.04 
1999 10 1999 4  Pharmaceuticals 7 6.67 9.46 
2000 9 2000 2  Refining&Extractive 5 4.77 7.18 
2001 20 2001 8  Retail 9 8.57 6.49 
2002 15 2002 20  Service 14 13.33 7.25 
2003 9 2003 20  Transportation 3 2.86 5.06 
2004 6 2004 12  Utilities 5 4.76 4.26 
2005 4 2005 5      
2006 8 2006 9      
2007 4 2007 7      
2008 3 2008 4      
2009 1 2009 5      
2010 1 2010 4      
2011 2 2011 2      
2012 1 2012 2      
Total 105   105   Total 105 100 97.06 
Note 
This table reports summary statistics for frequency of securities regulation noncompliance events/firms by year and industry. 
Following Dechow et al (2011), Industries are based on the following SIC codes: Agriculture: 0100–0999; Mining & Construction: 
1000–1299, 1400–1999; Food & Tobacco: 2000–2141;Textiles and Apparel: 2200–2399; Lumber, Furniture, & Printing: 2400–
2796;Chemicals: 2800–2824, 2840–2899; Refining & Extractive: 1300–1399,2900–2999; Durable Manufacturers: 3000–3569, 3580–
3669, 3680–3828, 3852-3999;Computers:3570–3579, 3670–3679, 7370–7379; Transportation: 4000–4899; Utilities: 4900–4999; 
Retail: 5000–5999; Services: 7000–7369, 7380–9999; Banks& Insurance: 6000–6999; Pharmaceuticals: 2830–2836, 3829–3851.  
The calculation of Compustat industry proportion is based on the firms which have valid financial statement data in year 2012. I do 




Table 3 Summary Statistics for Noncompliance Events 
Panel A: Frequency of 
Violation Days 
 
Panel B: Frequency of Violated Acts 
 
Panel C: Frequency of 
Violated Subsections of 
Acts 
 Panel D: Frequency of Involved Parties 
Vio_Days Freq 
Percent  Vio_Acts Vio_ Ind Total  Sub-sections Freq 
Percen
t  Involved Parties Freq 
Percent 
% % % 
1-999 70 66.67    0 1 .*    1 40 38.46  CEO/president/Chair 61 58.10 
1000-1999 22 20.95  Vio_33 60 44 1 105  2 31 29.81  Law_person 10 9.52 
2000-2999 9 8.57  Vio_34 17 87 1 105  3 18 17.31  CFO 10 9.52 
3000-3999  2 1.90 
 
Vio_ 
ICA40 100 5 0 105  
4 8 7.69 
 
Other_Top 17 16.19 
5000-5999  1 0.95 
 
Vio_ 
IAA40 101 4 0 105  
6 4 3.85 
    
>6000 1 0.95         8 2 1.92     
mean 917          . * 1 0.96     
median 516                       
Total  105 100               Total 105 100   Total 105 .** 
Note  
This table reports summarized details for the 126 (123) noncompliance events (firms). 
Vio_ Ind indicates if a specific Act was violated or not. 
Vio_Acts indicates what Act was violated. 
Vio_33 stands for the violated law was Securities Act of 1933. 
Vio_34  stands for the violated law was Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
Vio_ICA40 stands for the violated law was Investment Company Act of 1940. 
Vio_IAA40 stands for the violated law was Investment Advisers Act of 1940. 
Sub-sections is the number of subsections of Acts that a noncompliance event violated. 
Law_person is an indicator for the existence of a general counsel or compliance officer in the company. 
Other_Top is an indicator for senior executives, senior officers, or vice presidents. 
* For one of the two missing cases, the SEC issued a formal order of private investigation therefore this information is not publicly available. For the other case which involves 
insider trading, the violated acts information is missed without known reason. 
** One noncompliance event might involve multiple parties; therefore the sum of the percentage is not 100%. There are 11 events have no information on the involved parties. 
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Table 4 Logistic Regression for Propensity Score 
Panel A: Regression Results 
Noncompliance Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 
ROA -0.395 0.086 -4.59 <0.001 
SIZE 0.164 0.055 2.97 0.003 
LEVERAGE -0.079 0.199 -0.4 0.693 
LOSS -0.396 0.296 -1.34 0.180 
BIGN -0.829 0.292 -2.84 0.005 
AGE -0.324 0.195 -1.66 0.096 
BM -0.230 0.149 -1.55 0.121 
STOCKRET 0.105 0.056 1.87 0.062 
_CONS -5.805 1.151 -5.04 <0.001 
YEAR  Included    
N 19145    
LR chi2  93.58    
(p-value) (0.001)    
Pseudo R2 0.091       
Panel B: Distribution of Fitted Conditional Probabilities (P-scores) 
Sample N Mean 1st pct. 
25th 
pct. median 75th pct. 99th pct.                 
Control 
19,06
6 0.0041 0.0004 0.0012 0.0024 0.0045 0.0270 
Noncompliance 79 0.0188 0.0027 0.0026 0.0054 0.0209 0.1890 
Note 
This table reports logistic regression results for propensity scores. 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the odds of noncompliance. Noncompliance equals 1 if a firm is against by the 
SEC's enforcement actions; equals 0 if a firm is from COMPUSTAT potential control group. 
All variables are measured at the fiscal year (COMPUSTAT identification) where the noncompliance beginning date lies. 
Panel A contains regression results. Panel B provides distributional information of the fitted conditional probabilities (i.e. 
propensity scores) for two samples: the whole population for control group before matched and the noncompliance sample. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
  𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴               =  income before extraordinary items divided by total asset; 
  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆              = the natural log of outstanding common stock times share price;  
  𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆 = the sum of debt in current liability and long term debt divided by total assets; 
  𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆             = an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if income before extraordinary items is less than zero,  
                               and 0 otherwise; 
 𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵             = an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the auditor comes from Big Five, and 0 otherwise; 
 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆               = the natural log of firm’s age; 
 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵                 = Book− Market ratio, calculated  as book value of common equity divided by  market value of  
                                common equity;  
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆   = the difference between outstanding common stock times share price at year end and year  
                                begining divided by the market capitalization at year begining;   
 𝑌𝑌𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅            = an indicator variable for noncompliance beginning year; 
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Table 5. Covariate  Balancing Tests for Logistic Model 
Variable Unmatched/ Matched 
Mean %bias %reduct bias 
t-test Wilcoxon test 
Noncompliance Control t p>|t| t p>|t| 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)     (5)     (6) (7) (8) 
ROA Unmatched -0.999 -0.222 -52.90  -8.100 0.000   
 Matched -0.987 -0.850 -9.30 82.40 -0.450 0.652 -0.534 0.595 
SIZE Unmatched 5.235 5.213 0.70  0.070 0.942   
 Matched 5.272 5.047 7.20 -953.60 0.420 0.676 -0.813 0.419 
LEVERAGE Unmatched 0.450 0.256 34.20  4.010 0.000   
 Matched 0.441 0.375 11.50 66.20 0.600 0.552 -0.464 0.644 
LOSS Unmatched 0.494 0.446 9.50  0.850 0.396   
 Matched 0.494 0.390 20.80 -118.60 1.300 0.197 0.376 0.708 
BIGN Unmatched 0.570 0.716 -30.90  -2.890 0.004   
 Matched 0.558 0.571 -2.70 91.20 -0.160 0.872 -0.113 0.910 
AGE Unmatched 2.454 2.604 -19.50  -2.130 0.033   
 Matched 2.459 2.627 -22.00 -12.80 -1.270 0.206 -1.579 0.119 
BM Unmatched 0.139 0.456 -31.20  -3.520 0.000   
 Matched 0.184 0.197 -1.30 95.80 -0.080 0.939 -0.251 0.802 
STOCKRET Unmatched 0.811 0.368 23.50  2.840 0.005   
 Matched 0.840 0.614 12.00 49.00 0.680 0.496 1.118 0.267 
Pseudo R2 Unmatched 0.107  MeanBias Unmatched    24.70   
 Matched 0.052   Matched 10.00   
LR chi2 Unmatched 110.12  MedBias Unmatched 23.50   
 Matched 11.04   Matched 9.30   
p>chi2 Unmatched <0.001       
  Matched 0.440           
This table reports results for covariate balancing tests including standardized bias, a two-sample t-test, joint significance, Wilcoxon test, and Pseudo-R2. 
  %reduct bias is the percentage reduction in covariate bias. 
  MeanBias is the mean of standardized bias. 
  MedBias is the median of standardized bias. 
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Table 6. Firm-level GAAP Violation Rates for Noncompliance and Control Samples 
Windows 
Noncompliance Control 
Fisher's Exact Test 
 (N=77)  (N=77) 
percent(%)    number percent(%)   number Table Probability(P) 
Two-sided Pr 
<=P 
Windows centred on noncompliance initiation date 
(-3, 3)       14.29            11            7.79            6 0.091 0.304 
(-2, 2)       14.29            11            5.19            4 0.037 0.100 
(-1, 1)       10.39              8            3.90            3 0.077 0.209 
(d)         1.30              1            0.00            0 0.500 1.000 
Windows pre- noncompliance 
(-3, -1)        7.79              6            6.49            5 0.233 1.000 
(-2, -1)        5.19              4             3.90            3 0.279 1.000 
(-1)        2.60              2            2.60            2 0.380 1.000 
Windows post noncompliance 
(d, 3)       12.99            10            3.90            3 0.031 0.079 
(1, 3)       11.69             9            3.90            3 0.049 0.130 
(1, 2)       11.69             9            2.60            2 0.024 0.056 
(1)         7.79             6            1.30            1 0.051 0.116 
Note  
This table reports firm-level GAAP violation rates for noncompliance and control firms. 
 
We measure the ratio of GAAP violations separately for noncompliance and control firms during each violation window. For the 
analysis of restatements over a given window, we calculate the number of treatment and control firms restating their financial 
statements at least once during entire window and divide them by the number of firms in each sample, respectively. This 
approach counts firm-level restatements once during a given violation window regardless of how many times the firm restates 
during the period. 
 
Restatement data is collected from Audit Analytics' restatement dataset.  
(-3, 3) is a six-year window centring on noncompliance initiation date with a coverage of preceding three years to subsequent 
three years.  
(-2, 2) is a four-year window centring on the date noncompliance began with a coverage of preceding two years to subsequent 
two years.  
(-1, 1) is a two-year window centring on the date noncompliance began with a coverage of preceding one year to subsequent one 
year.  
(-3, -1) is a three-year window covering three years preceding to the date noncompliance began. 
(-2, -1) is a two-year window covering two years preceding to the date noncompliance began.  
(-1) is a one-year window covering one year preceding to the date noncompliance began. 
(d) is the date on which a noncompliance event started. 
(d, 3) is a three-year window starting with the date noncompliance began to subsequent three years.  
(1, 3) is a three-year window starting with one day after the date noncompliance began to subsequent three years.  
(1, 2) is a two-year window starting with one day after the date noncompliance began to subsequent two years. 




Table 7. Restatement-level GAAP Violation Rates for  Noncompliance and Control Samples       
Panel A.  Windows centred on noncompliance beginning year         
  (-3, 3)  (-2, 2)   (-1, 1) 
Restatement  
 





Frequency (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Cumulative   64.71 35.29   78.57 21.43   72.73 27.27 
1  27.27 50.00  63.64 50.00  87.50 66.67 
2  63.64 16.67 
 36.36 25.00  12.50 0 
3  9.09 16.67 
 0 25.00  0 33.33 




Total   100.00 100.00   100.00 100.00   100.00 100.00 
Panel B.  Windows pre- noncompliance             





Noncompliance           Control 
 
Noncompliance           Control 
Frequency (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Cumulative   54.55 45.45   57.14 42.86  33.33 66.67 
1  83.33 40.00  100.00 66.67  100.00 50.00 
2  16.67 40.00  0 0  0 0 
3  0 20.00  0 33.33  0 50.00 
Total   100.00 100.00   100.00 100.00   100.00 100.00 
Panel C.  Windows post- noncompliance             








Frequency (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Cumulative   76.92 23.08   75.00 25.00   75.00 25.00 
1  70.00 100.00  66.67 100.00  88.89 100.00 
2  30.00 0 
 33.33 0  11.11 0 
Total   100.00 100.00   100.00 100.00   100.00 100.00 
Note 
  
This table reports restatement-level GAAP violation rates for noncompliance and control firms. Restatement frequency is the total number of individual restatements per 
form over a given window.  
Restatement data is collected from Audit Analytics' restatement dataset.  
(-3, 3) is a six-year window centring on noncompliance beginning date with a coverage of preceding three years to subsequent three years.  
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(-2, 2) is a four-year window centring on the date noncompliance began with a coverage of preceding two years to subsequent two years.  
(-1, 1) is a two-year window centring on the date noncompliance began with a coverage of preceding one year to subsequent one year.  
(-3, -1) is a three-year window covering three years preceding to the date noncompliance began. 
(-2, -1) is a two-year window covering two years preceding to the date noncompliance began.  
(-1) is a one-year window covering one year preceding to the date noncompliance began. 
(d, 3) is a three-year window starting with the date noncompliance began to subsequent three years.  
(1, 3) is a three-year window starting with one day after the date noncompliance began to subsequent three years.  




Table 8. Restatements Occurrence in Noncompliance and Control Samples(1:N matches) 
Windows 
Noncompliance            Control Fisher's Exact Test 
percent(%)   number percent(%)   number Table Probability(P) Two-sided Pr <=P 
1:2 matches                     (N=74)                           (N=128) 
(-3, 3) 12.16            9      8.78            13 0.133 0.477 
(-2, 2) 12.16            9      6.76            10 0.079 0.205 
(-1, 1) 8.11              6      4.73              7 0.139 0.367 
(d,  3) 10.81            8      4.73              7 0.055 0.097 
(1,  3) 9.46             7      4.73              7 0.090 0.240 
(1,  2) 9.46             7      4.05              6 0.066 0.131 
(1) 5.41             4      2.70              4 0.171 0.446 
1:3 matches                   (N=71)                              (N=213) 
(-3, 3) 11.27             8      7.51            16 0.114 0.330 
(-2, 2) 11.27             8      5.63            12 0.059 0.115 
(-1, 1) 7.04              5      3.76              8 0.126 0.322 
(d, 3) 9.86              7      3.29              7 0.026 0.050 
(1, 3) 8.45              6      3.29              7 0.054 0.097 
(1, 2) 8.45              6      2.82              6 0.038 0.080 
(1) 4.23              3      1.88              4 0.174 0.372 
 Note 
This table reports the occurrence of restatements around noncompliance events with 1:2 and 1:3 PSM matches. Restatements 
occurrence has only been calculated once in each window while multiple restatement occurred in that window. 
Restatement data is collected from Audit Analytics' restatement dataset.  
(-3, 3) is a six-year window centring on noncompliance beginning date with a coverage of preceding three years to subsequent 
three years.  
(-2, 2) is a four-year window centring on the date noncompliance began with a coverage of preceding two years to subsequent two 
years.  
(-1, 1) is a two-year window centring on the date noncompliance began with a coverage of preceding one year to subsequent one 
year.  
(d, 3) is a three-year window starting with the date noncompliance began to subsequent three years.  
(1, 3) is a three-year window starting with one day after the date noncompliance began to subsequent three years.  
(1, 2) is a two-year window starting with one day after the date noncompliance began to subsequent two years. 
(1) is a one-year window covering one year after the date noncompliance began.  
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Table 9. Mantel-Haenszel (1959) Bounds for Post-Noncompliance Effect Estimation 
Panel A: MHbounds for Restatements’ 3years window 
(0, 3) 
Panel B: Summary of MHbounds Test for Post-
noncompliance Windows with Significant Effect 
     Γ  𝑄𝑄𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀+    𝑄𝑄𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀−       𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚ℎ+        𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚ℎ−  Windows  Critical Γ cut-off (p=10%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (1) 
1** 1.73347 1.73347 0.041506 0.041506 Restatement (1, 3) 1.2 
1.1* 1.57618 1.9051 0.057492 0.028384 Restatement (1, 2) 1.5 
1.2* 1.42984 2.05952 0.076382 0.019722 Restatement (1) 1.3 
1.3* 1.29706 2.20422 0.097305 0.013754   
1.4 1.17557 2.34063 0.119883 0.009626   
1.5 1.06359 2.46986 0.143757 0.006758   
1.6 0.959739 2.59283 0.168593 0.00476   
1.7 0.862901 2.71026 0.194096 0.003362   
1.8 0.772175 2.82278 0.220006 0.00238   
1.9 0.686816 2.9309 0.246099 0.00169   
2 0.606209 3.03506 0.272188 0.001202    
Note 
 
      
This table reports MHbounds statistics for the estimation effects on the three-year window (0, 3) of restatement data as an 
example, and the summary of critical values of  Γ for the post-noncompliance windows where significant noncompliance 
effects are observed. 
Γ : odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
𝑄𝑄𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀+  : Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: over-estimation of treatment effect) 
𝑄𝑄𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀−  : Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: under-estimation of treatment effect) 
𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚ℎ + : significance level (assumption: over-estimation of treatment effect) 
𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚ℎ−  : significance level (assumption: under-estimation of treatment effect) 





Table 10. Differences in Corporate Governance Mechanisms between Noncompliance and Control Samples 
Panel A: Corporate Governance Differences  
Variable 
Noncompliance  Control  t-test for mean differences 
Obs. Mean Median  Obs. Mean Median  t-statistic           p-value 
Panel B: Corporate Governance Changes Surrounding Noncompliance 
Variable (1) Change  for Noncompliance  (t+1)- (t-1) 
(2) Change for Control 
 (t+1)- (t-1) 
 
(3) Noncompliance Change 
VS Control Change 
 (t+1)- (t-1) 
 Mean t-test p-value Obs. Mean t-test 
p-





BOARD_SIZE 0.054 0.25 0.805 56 -0.061 -0.25 0.805 66 0.180 0.54 0.588 50 
DUALITY  0.018 0.30 0.766 57 -0.015 -0.38 0.709 66 0.059 0.77 0.444 51 
Pre-noncompliance (t-2, t-1)          
BOARD_SIZE 114 7.053 6.000  127 7.670 8.000        1.40                0.164 
DUALITY 116 0.733 1.000  127 0.622 1.000       -1.85                0.065* 
SD_PERCENT 116 0.573 0.600  127 0.560 0.600       -0.37                0.713 
STAGGERED_BOARD 115 0.321 0.000  127 0.142 0.000       -3.35                <0.001*** 
AUDIT_COMMITTEE_SIZE 98 2.704 3.000  127 3.189 3.000        2.20                0.029** 
COMPENSATION_COMMITTEE_SIZE 100 2.36 3.000  127 2.661 3.000        1.28                0.202 
NOMINATION_COMMITTEE_SIZE 100 1.620 0.000  127 1.402 0.000      -0.80                 0.425 
LAW_ON_BOARD  116 0.422 0.000  127 0.394 0.000      -0.45                 0.651 
LAW_PERCENT  114 0.084 0.000  127 0.070 0.000      -0.88                 0.379 
Post- noncompliance (t+1, t+2)          
BOARD_SIZE 113 7.487 7.000  140 7.85 8.000         0.81                 0.416 
DUALITY 114 0.702 1.000  140 0.593 1.000       -1.82                  0.070* 
SD_PERCENT 109 0.581 0.667  140 0.581 0.615       -0.00                 0.999 
STAGGERED_BOARD 111 0.360 0.000  140 0.114 0.000       -4.63                <0.001*** 
AUDIT_COMMITTEE_SIZE 101 2.911 3.000  140 3.464 3.000    2.58                  0.011** 
COMPENSATION_COMMITTEE_SIZE 99 2.515 3.000  140 2.907 3.000        1.63                  0.105 
NOMINATION_COMMITTEE_SIZE 99 1.929 2.000  140 2.014 2.000        0.31                  0.758 
LAW_ON_BOARD  114 0.412 0.000  140 0.443 0.000        0.49                  0.626 
LAW_PERCENT  111 0.065 0.000  140 0.085 0.000        1.46                  0.146 
56 
 
SD_PERCENT -0.008 -0.35 0.728 55 -0.014 -0.42 0.675 66 0.036  0.75 0.456 50 
STAGGERED_BOARD 0.000 . . 56 0.000 . . 66 0 . . 51 
AUDIT_COMMITTEE_SIZE -0.020 -0.15 0.880 49 0.167 1.29 0.200 66 -0.227 -1.22 0.229 44 
COMPENSATION_COMMITTEE_SIZE 0.000 0.00 1.000 48 0.136 1.14 0.260 66 -0.116 -0.63 0.535 43 
NOMINATION_COMMITTEE_SIZE 0.14 0.69 0.492 48 0.258 2.42 0.018 66 -0.009 -0.35 0.730 43 
LAW_ON_BOARD -0.035 -0.63 0.532 57 0.015 0.30 0.766 66 0 0.00 1.000 51 
LAW_PERCENT  -0.009 -0.55 0.584 56 0.013 1.20 0.234 66 -0.013 -0.71 0.481 51 
Note 
 
      
This table reports the differences in corporate governance mechanisms between noncompliance and control samples.  
BOARD_SIZE is the number of directors on board. 
DUALITY is an indicator variable that equals one if the CEO and the chairman in the firm is the same person, and zero otherwise. 
SD_PERCENT is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board.                                                                                                                                              
STAGGERED_BOARD is an indicator variable that equals one if the directors of the board are divided into more than one class and zero otherwise. 
AUDIT_COMMITTEE_SIZE is the number of directors on audit committee of the board. 
COMPENSATION_COMMITTEE_SIZE is the number of directors on compensation committee of the board. 
NOMINATION_COMMITTEE_SIZE is the number of directors on nomination committee of the board. 
LAW_ON_BOARD is an indicator variable that equals one if at least one director on the board has law background, and zero otherwise. 
LAW_PERCENT is the percentage of directors with law background on the board.      
 
